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A Appendix (not for publication)
A.1 An Alternative Model of Valuations
In this appendix, we investigate a more general model of valuations of the good. In the base model, the nal
valuation of a customer is the multiplication of the valuations of the customer before and after visiting the
mall, and after-visit valuations has a two-point distribution. More precisely, the nal valuation is vz, where
v is realized before visiting the mall and z after visiting it (and examining the good) and is either zero or
one.
We now consider a more general alternative in which the after-visit valuations have a smooth distrib-
ution.16 This model is more attractive for two reasons. First, now our specication of good valuation by
customers becomes more realistic as it links the probability of purchase to the endogenous choice variables
of the model, such as the price of the good. Second, the probability of a purchase is now heterogeneous
among the customers and those who have higher before-visit valuations are more likely to buy the good. We
show that free parking is an equilibrium as long as the distribution of z is su¢ ciently dispersed and satises
the monotone hazard rate property.
We now assume that z = e, where  is distributed on (; ) with a density h() and a distribution
function H() that satises the monotone hazard rate property. In this case, a customer buys the good if
ve  P , and thus the probability that a customer will buy the good is given by (v; P ) = 1 H(lnP   ln v)
if lnP   ln v 2 (; ), one if lnP   ln v  , and zero otherwise. Notice that this model explicitly allows for
some customers to always purchase the good. This happens when ve  P holds, which is always the case
when  >  1 and v !1.
16We also worked out the additive model, in which the nal valuation is v+ z rather than vz. Although we obtained similar
results in that model, we report the multiplicative model here for two reasons. First, the expressions we derive here naturally
resemble the ones in the base model. Second, the technical details are easier to deal with.
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The customers expected utility from going to the mall is now
E (ujP; t) =
Z 

u (max [w + ve   P   t; w   t]) dH ()
=
Z 
lnP ln v
u (w + ve   P   t) dH () +H (lnP   ln v)u (w   t)
=  (v; P )E (ujP; t;   lnP   ln v) + (1   (v; P ))u (w   t) :(A.1)
This says that a customer who visits the mall buys the good with (v; P ), in which case he gets E(ujP; t;  
lnP   ln v) in expectation, and he does not buy the good with the complementary probability, in which case
he gets u (w   t). This is almost identical to what we have in the base model except now his probability of
making a purchase is also dependent on the realization of his after-examination valuation.
The customer visits the shopping mall if his expected utility of doing so is at least as high as his
reservation utility: E (ujP; t)  u (w + r), which denes the (unique) value of the good to the marginal
customer who is indi¤erent between visiting and not visiting the shopping mall, ~v:
(A.2)  (~v; P )E (ujP; t;   lnP   ln v) + (1   (~v; P ))u (w   t) = u (w + r) :
Implicit di¤erentiation yields that
(A.3) ~vP = 1 and ~vt = 1 +
(1   (~v; P ))
 (~v; P )
u0 (w   t)
E (u0jP; t;   lnP   ln v) 
1
 (~v; P )
:
The inequality follows from the fact that u0() is decreasing for risk-averse customers, and thus u0(w  
t)=E(u0jP; t;   lnP   ln v) > 1 since w + ve   P   t  w   t if   lnP   ln v.
We focus on the cases in which the marginal customer faces some risk. This requires that his probability
of purchase to be non-degenerate, or that (~v; P ) < 1. Therefore, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 The marginal customer does not always buy the good, or ~ve < P for any P > 0.
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A su¢ cient condition to satisfy this assumption is clearly  =  1, but we do not make this assumption
because it is desirable to allow for some customers to always purchase the good.
The expected probability of purchase, E(), is given by
(A.4) E () =
Z v
~v
[1 H (lnP   ln v)] dF (v)
1  F (~v) :
The integral is for customers who decide to come to the mall, thus from ~v to v. The rst term in it is the
probability of buying the good for a customer who has generic valuation v. Thus, the integral gives the
expected value of probability of buying for those who visit the mall, who has a mass of 1   F (~v). In this
model, a higher price of the good means lower demand for two reasons. First, just like in the base model,
only individuals who have higher valuations come in response to a higher price. Second, of those who come
to the mall, the probability of making a purchase decreases. Using E(), we can write the prot of the mall
as follows
(A.5)  (P; t) = [1  F (~v)] (E ()P + t  c) :
Notice that this prot equation looks almost the same as the one we provide in the base model (equation 4).
The average decrease in the probability of purchase due to a price increase, h (~v), is given by
(A.6) h (~v) =
Z v
~v
h (lnP   ln v) dF (v)
1  F (~v) :
Given this, we can write the rst-order conditions elegantly as
P = [1  F (~v)]
 
E ()  h (~v)  f (~v) ( (~v; P )P + (t  c)) ~vP(A.7)
t = [1  F (~v)]  f (~v) ( (~v; P )P + (t  c)) ~vt:(A.8)
The rst term in each rst-order condition is the direct impact of either P or t on prots. The second term
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in each derivative is the direct e¤ect of increasing ~v. This is essentially the loss of prot from the marginal
customers.
Our primary goal is to show that parking is free as long as the marginal customer does not face too
much risk and raising the price does not drive customers away too much. If we set P = 0, then we nd
that t < 0 if
(A.9)
1
~vt
< E ()  h (~v) :
One can immediately recognize that this is an inverted version of equation 7 of the base model except now
we have a new last term, which is the decrease in the average probability of purchase in response to an
increase in the price. If this decrease is too large, we may well get positive parking fees in equilibrium
because increasing the parking fee does not have a direct e¤ect on the probability of purchase. We do not
think that this is the usual case. As we show in the following proposition, if the density h() is small enough,
then parking is free and the prot function is globally concave, so we have a unique equilibrium.
Proposition 10 If density h () is small enough for all , then parking is free in equilibrium.
The proof is simple after recognizing that equation A.9 is equivalent to
(A.10)
 (~v; P )
(1   (~v; P ))
(1  E ()) + h (~v)
E ()  h (~v) <
u0 (w   t)
E (u0jP; t;   lnP   ln v) :
Note that E()  (~v; P ) and thus (~v; P )=(1   (~v; P ))  E()=(1   E()) or [(~v; P )=(1   (~v; P ))][(1  
E())=E()]  1. The right-hand side of equation A.10 is strictly higher than one by diminishing marginal
utilities, thus if h(~v) is small enough the inequality A.10 always holds and parking fee is set to zero in
equilibrium. Given that this inequality holds, one can also establish that the second-order condition holds
globally if h () is small enough, which guarantees a unique equilibrium when the monotone hazard rate
property holds for h() as well (the formal proof is available upon request).
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Finally, the optimal price is given by
(A.11) P =
(1  F (~v))
f (~v)
E ()  h (~v)
 (~v; P )
+
c
 (~v; P )
:
Again, note the similarity to the base model (equation 8). The only di¤erence is that (E()  h(~v))=(~v; P )
is one in the base model. Notice that, in this equilibrium, E()   h(~v) > 1=~vt  (~v; P ), and hence the
equilibrium price is now higher. With simple analysis, one can still establish that this prot is higher than
the prots when P = 0 and t > 0, in which case everyone comes to the mall.
A.2 Alternative Models of Parking-lot Size
In this appendix, we show that the key result of Section 3 holds under alternative rationing rules. The key
result we are interested in is that society still wants a larger parking lot than the shopping mall in a full social
optimum. In our base model, we assume that if the parking lot is too small then all customers randomize
before they go to the shopping mall so that only an l mass of customers shows up. Thus, there is random
rationing. One may think that assuming that customers know the total potential mass of demand is too
strong of an assumption. This would give rise to the model in Appendix A.2.1. In this rst-in-rst-served
rationing model, all customers go to the mall and some do not nd a parking space. Alternatively, one may
be interested in the socially e¢ cient mechanism of only having the highest-value customers shop. This is
the e¢ cient rationing model in Appendix A.2.2. In both of these cases, we show that our key result holds.
A.2.1 Parking Shortages
If everyone always goes to the mall and only some nd a parking space, this is similar to reducing . Now,
the customer is able to buy the good only if he goes to the shopping mall and if there is an available parking
space. Given M , the probability of parking is  = min [M (1  F (~v)) ; l] = (M (1  F (~v))).
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Note that
(A.12) l =
8>><>>:
1
M(1 F (~v)) > 0 if l < M (1  F (~v))
1 if l M (1  F (~v))
;
and
(A.13) P =
8>><>>:
lf(~v)
M(1 F (~v))2 > 0 if l < M (1  F (~v))
0 if l M (1  F (~v))
:
Now, ~v is directly a¤ected by l and M :
(A.14) ~v = u 1

u (w + r)  (1  )u (w   t)


  w + P + t;
and ~vl = (l=2) [u (w   t)  u (w + r)] =u0 (w + ~v   P   t), which is strictly negative when l > 0.
Given that t = 0, the prot of the mall is
(A.15)  (P; t; l) =
MZ
M
min [M (1  F (~v)) ; l]dG (M) P   lc:
The rst-order conditions of malls prot maximization are
P =  f (~v) ~vPP
MZ
M
MdG (M) + P
MZ
M
min [M (1  F (~v)) ; l]PdG (M)
+ 
MZ
M
min [M (1  F (~v)) ; l]dG (M)(A.16)
l =  f (~v) ~vlP
~MZ
M
MdG (M)+ P
MZ
M
min [M (1  F (~v)) ; l] dG (M)l
+ P
MZ
~M
dG (M)  c:(A.17)
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Equation A.17 has two new positive terms, resulting in a larger optimal parking lot. The welfare
expression will be changed by this. Like before, we only need to analyze the net utility, U (P; t; l), which is
given by
(A.18) U (P; t; l) =
MZ
M
M
vZ
0
max [u (w + v   P ) + (1  )u (w) ; u (w + r)] dF (v) dG (M) :
The derivative of welfare with respect to l at the prot-maximizing lot size is
(A.19) Wljl=0 = Ul =
MZ
~M
M
vZ
~v
(u (w + v   P )  u (w)) ldF (v) dG (M) > 0:
So, we still conclude that a social planner prefers a larger parking lot than the mall in the full social optimum.
A.2.2 Asymmetric Sorting
In another alternative model, instead of everyone going to the parking lot, only the highest-value customers
go to purchase the good when the demand is too high, or the critical value for the mall, vas, is
(A.20) vas =
8>><>>:
F 1
 
1  lM

if M (1  F (~v)) > l
~v if M (1  F (~v))  l
;
where ~v is given by equation 2. Note that vasl =   (1=M)
 
F 1
0
< 0 if vas > ~v.
The prot of the mall is
(A.21)  (P; t; l) =
MZ
M
M (1  F (vas)) dG (M) (P + t)  lc:
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Again, after letting t = 0, the rst-order conditions of malls prot-maximization are
P (P; t; l) =  
~MZ
M
Mf (~v) dG (M) P + 
MZ
M
M (1  F (vas)) dG (M) = 0(A.22)
l (P; t; l) =

1 G

~M

P   c = 0;(A.23)
where again ~M (1  F (~v)) = l. l (P; t; l) is the same as it is in the original model and thus we get the same
value for l. However, like before, the net utility is di¤erent. In this case, it is more convenient to break the
customers into two groups, one of which is able to purchase at the given level of M and P :
U (P; t; l) =
MZ
M
M
24 vZ
vas
[u (w + v   P ) + (1  )u (w)] dF (v)
35 dG (M)
+
MZ
M
M
24 vasZ
0
u (w + r) dF (v)
35 dG (M) :(A.24)
The critical derivative is the derivative of welfare with respect to l at the prot-maximizing lot size:
(A.25) Wljl=0 = Ul =
MZ
~M
M [(u (w + vas   P ) + (1  )u (w)  u (w + r)) ( vasl ) f (vas)] dG (M) > 0:
So, once again, we get the same result; the social planner desires a larger parking lot than the mall in the
full social optimum.
A.3 Proof of dP=dl < 0
The equilibrium price is given by equation 24. Modifying this expression gives
(A.26)  = [f (~v)P   (1  F (~v))]G

~M

E
h
M jM  ~M
i
  (1  F (~v))

1 G

~M

~M = 0:
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By the Implicit Function Theorem, we have
(A.27)
dP
dl
=   @=@l
@=@P
:
Let us rst derive @=@l:
d
dl
= (f (~v)P   (1  F (~v))) ~Mg

~M

~Ml   (1  F (~v))

~Ml   ~MlG

~M

  ~Mg

~M

~Ml

= ~Ml

(f (~v)P   (1  F (~v))) ~Mg

~M

  (1  F (~v))

1 G

~M

  ~Mg

~M

= ~Ml

f (~v)P ~Mg

~M

  (1  F (~v))

1 G

~M

:(A.28)
Substituting for P from equation 24 yields
d
dl
= ~Ml (1  F (~v))
0@ ~Mg  ~M+

1 G

~M

~M2g

~M

G

~M

E
h
M jM  ~M
i   1 G ~M
1A
= ~Ml (1  F (~v))
0@ ~Mg  ~M+

1 G

~M
 h
~M2g

~M

 G

~M

E
h
M jM  ~M
ii
G

~M

E
h
M jM  ~M
i
1A ;(A.29)
where ~Ml = 1=(1  F (~v)) > 0. Remember that we assume g(M) > 0 and 1 < Mg(M) for all M 2 [M; M ],
which implies that G( ~M) < ~Mg( ~M) because G( ~M)  1. Multiplying the left-hand side by E[M jM  ~M ]
and the right-hand side by ~M does not change this inequality since 0 < E[M jM  ~M ] < ~M . Hence,
g( ~M) ~M2  G( ~M)E[M jM  ~M ] > 0. Consequently we get
(A.30)
d
dl
> 0:
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Now, consider @=@P :
d
dP
=

f 0 (~v)P + 2f(~v)

G

~M

E
h
M jM  ~M
i
+ [f (~v)P   (1  F (~v))] ~Mg

~M

~MP
 
h
 f(~v)

1 G

~M

  g

~M

~MP (1  F (~v))

~M + (1  F (~v))

1 G

~M

~MP
i
=

f 0 (~v)P + 2f(~v)

G

~M

E
h
M jM  ~M
i
+ f (~v)P ~Mg

~M

~MP + ~Mf(~v)

1 G

~M

  (1  F (~v))

1 G

~M

~MP ;(A.31)
where ~MP = ( ~Mf(~v))=(1  F (~v)). Hence,
d
dP
=

f 0 (~v)P + 2f(~v)

G

~M

E
h
M jM  ~M
i
+ f (~v)P ~M2g

~M
 f (~v)
1  F (~v)
=f 0 (~v)PG

~M

E
h
M jM  ~M
i
+ 2f(~v)G

~M

E
h
M jM  ~M
i
+ f (~v)P ~M2g

~M
 f (~v)
1  F (~v)
=P

G

~M

E
h
M jM  ~M
i
f 0 (~v) + g

~M

~M2
f2 (~v)
1  F (~v)

+ 2f(~v)G

~M

E
h
M jM  ~M
i
> 0:(A.32)
From the monotone hazard rate property we know that
(A.33) f 0 (~v) +
f2 (~v)
1  F (~v) > 0:
Multiplying the rst term of this expression with G( ~M)E[M jM  ~M ] and the second term with g( ~M) ~M2
does not change the inequality because ~M2g( ~M) G( ~M)E[M jM  ~M ] > 0. Then, we conclude that
(A.34)
d
dP
> 0:
Finally, equations A.30 and A.34 imply that dP=dl < 0, which means that if the lot size is increased the
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mall will decrease its price.
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